The 'substance' of the human is not spirit as the synthesis of soul and body, but existence" (Martin Heidegger).
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Amongst the various questions raised by Heidegger's appropriation of Kierkegaard, the one on which I focus here is the question of the limits placed by an ontotheology and anthropology-an ontoanthropotheology-of the "subject" on investigations concerning the relations between being and time. Does conceiving of the human as a "subject" necessarily falsify or distort the relationship between the human and being and/or time? Is the "subject" necessarily always conceived as Vorhandenheit, which is to say, as existentia = Wirklichkeit in a manner that obscures its "authentic" temporality? How far does Kierkegaard take us-and in what ways does he block us from proceedingalong the road to understanding how human beings exist in time, and how time structures human existence? In order to pursue these and related questions, I
begin by expanding briefly on Heidegger's reasons for rejecting a philosophy of the subject, and then I outline his characterization of Kierkegaard as representing such a philosophy. This preparation enables me to consider then with reference to The Concept of Anxiety whether or not Kierkegaard simply remains within a metaphysics of subjective presence in Heidegger's sense, and whether or not his conception of time is simply reducible to the "vulgar" notion of time,
Innerzeitigkeit or "within-timeness," as Heidegger argues. (I ignore the question and role of pseudonyms here, although I by no means dismiss their importance more generally for an interpretation of Kierkegaard's works, and especially of the "subject" in these works.) Having pursued these questions, finally, I very briefly consider whether or not Heidegger's own model of Dasein, including his later thinking of the truth of Being, entirely exceeds the metaphysics of the subject.
This trajectory leads to the suggestion that, on the one hand, Kierkegaard goes somewhat farther toward Heidegger's thought than Heidegger can or will quite give him credit for, and that, on the other hand, Heidegger, through the limitations of his own thought, remains closer to Kierkegaard than he can acknowledge. Such a provisional result, which attempts less to be original than to be reasonably judicious, is not meant to invalidate Heidegger's thought, but to help us in a small way to gauge, in relation to Kierkegaard and through the rereading of certain Kierkegaardian motifs from The Concept of Anxiety, where Heidegger is to be situated in his progress toward his own stated philosophical ambitions.
More generally and importantly, it reopens the question of the subject beyond the limits of Heidegger's critique of Kierkegaard.
I.
Before coming to Heidegger's characterization of Kierkegaard's thought as an onto-anthropo-theological subjectivism that is problematically metaphysical in its conception of being as presence and of truth as restricted to the truth of beings, we need to recall what Heidegger says about the notion of the "subject" in general in Being and Time. 3 The problem with the construal of the human being as a subject for Heidegger is that one always presupposes for this subject an ontological status of Vorhandenheit, or "(objective) presence," as Stambaugh translates it, and which Heidegger chooses explicitly from the outset of Sein und Zeit as the German terminological equivalent of existentia (42; 41). In construing the human being as a subject, one unwittingly treats it like a thing. (In this sense, traditional philosophical conceptions of the subject never treat it, as it were, subjectively enough.) The ontological determination of Da-sein as "je meines" does indeed entail an ontic self-evidence that the "who" of Da-sein is always "I"-an ego, subject, or self, which sustains itself as identical through the changes of attitudes and experiences. But this implication of a present [vorhanden] subjektum, "lying at the base of" consciousness, is something like a transcendental illusion, because my Being is mine always also as my having-tobe it, i.e. it does not ground me here and now except insofar as it awaits my reassumption of it there and then. My being is temporally dispersed. This is- Heidegger's argument against subjectivity, we need now to consider how
Heidegger situates Kierkegaard with respect to this problematic of the subjective.
II.
Fourteen years after the publication of Sein und Zeit, in the first part of the lectures on Schelling from 1941, entitled Die Metaphysik des deutschen Idealismus, while the War and the Holocaust are well underway, Heidegger is working hard to distinguish himself not only from existentialism in general (and specifically in Jaspers and Kierkegaard), but also from subjectivism. He quotes at length and responds bitterly, for example, to Nikolai Hartmann's recent accusations to this effect, but that particular polemic is not our topic here. In the process of marking his distance from the "philosophy of existence," Heidegger characterizes Kierkegaard's thought of "existence" as one that identifies "existence" with "reality" [Wirklichsein] , and yet also with "subjectivity," with But on the other hand, Kierkegaard in his role both as "religious thinker"
(19) and also as "writer" (26) 
III.
Of the various ways in which Kierkegaard might be seen to push or gesture beyond a metaphysics of presence (and hence beyond the subject in Moreover, under the pressure of Kierkegaard's analysis, the notion of possibility appears at times difficult to distinguish from impossibility itself. In light of the fact that there is an abyss between possibility and actuality-an abyss that remains despite the tendency of the terms to become undecidable-possibility is radically altered through the "qualitative leap" of the act, such that even that subset of the possible chosen for realization never allows its realization as such or unaltered. This would be perhaps one implication of the "absolute future"
David Kangas talks about in Kierkegaard's Instant. 7 It is certainly one meaning of the "prohibition" that language utters in The Concept of Anxiety-the cloud of "no" resting on all of possibility, connecting us as it were in advance with the impossibility. The possible is impossible. In Heidegger, the Moment takes shape as a stepping out of or back from the preoccupation with the activities of the everyday (as taking care and concern for beings in the world-Besorgen and Fürsorge) into the pure interplay between futurity and pastness (or the casting forward of understanding and the being-cast of mood). "Resolutely, Dasein has just taken itself back out of falling prey, in order to be that much more authentically in the "moment" (>>Augenblick<<)
gazing at the situation >>there<<" (328; 313). The experience of the "moment" is one that opens up the elements of the "situation" through a "decision" or "resolution" (338; 313). But the decision holds the present in futurity and havingbeen: it views the situation in the framework of time. The Augenblick is thus much more like the presentation of the absence of the present, the presentation or vision of the present's anticipatory and repetitive structure, than like the presentation of its presence. It is the "moment" of the unveiling of the temporality of existence rather than of its evasion through the immersion in any pure now.
How, then, does Kierkegaard's "moment" measure up against this "moment"? Are they, as it were, contemporaneous? And how accurate is Rather, only a certain "synthesis" of this fleeting instant with eternity constitutes temporality in its dimensionally differentiated sense. This "synthesis" articulates body with soul, or spirit (as substance), on the level of temporality, as the moment, except that, according to Kierkegaard, there is no third term in the "synthesis" of time with eternity: their "synthesis" must be understood as remaining in some sense unachieved, or tenuous at best: it is a "relation of time to eternity and . . . the reflection of eternity in time" (85). Since Kierkegaard argues that in the "passing by" that is time as infinite succession there is no "present" and therefore no past or future, on the one hand Heidegger does not do Kierkegaard justice by suggesting that Kierkegaard places the "moment" in "being-in-time." When Heidegger says, "Time as within-time-ness knows only the now but never a moment," it seems clear that Kierkegaard would agree with him.
On the other hand, it is impossible to deny that Kierkeggard "defines the moment with the help of the now and eternity." However, it remains to be seen in what respects such a definition is at odds with Heidegger's approach to the three ecstases of time, and in what respects it accords with that approach. Let us begin with the eternal. The eternal, for Kierkegaard, is "the present," as "an annulled succession," and "the present is full" (86). So in the contradiction constitutive of "the moment," emptiness confronts fullness, and passing-by confronts presence.
Thus far, Kierkegaard certainly seems to ground temporality qua infinite succession in a supratemporal substance. And this aspect of his text cannot, I
think, be denied.
But it is not the only aspect. For example, when Kierkegaard says that time as infinite succession is "time past" (87), then he is delineating perhaps something like the "having-been-ness" or Gewesenheit that Heidegger envisions.
The eternal, on the other hand, is associated with the future:
the future in a certain sense signifies more than the present and the past, because in a certain sense the future is the whole of which the past is a part, and the future can in a certain sense signify the whole. This is because the eternal first signifies the future or because the future is the incognito in which the eternal, even though it is incommensurable with time, nevertheless preserves its association with time (89).
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If the eternal is the future, which Heidegger conceives as the ekstasis of the "ahead of oneself [sich-vorweg] ," while time is the past, which Heidegger characterizes as "already being in (the-world) [schon sein in (der-Welt-)]" and the moment is the "touch" or "intersection" of these two contradictory dimensions, which would correspond approximately to Heidegger's "being alongside of (the existents encountered within the world) [sein bei (innerweltlich begegnendem that often goes hand in hand with these? I will restrict myself, concerning this extraordinarily complex theme, to two brief remarks. Being. Through such formulations, Heidegger suggests that humanity has as its purpose to serve Being, which implies a theology of God or gods or fate, as the language of Seinsgeschick in the later work also suggests, as well as a subjection of the human subject to this divine instance.
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Second remark: there remains the complex and often discussed question of Heideggerian resoluteness and the authenticity it is to realize. For resoluteness or decision is perhaps despite everything not so easy to distinguish from a sovereign subjectivity insisting on itself and on its proper identity, in this akin to Carl Schmitt's version of decisionism. The affinities of Heideggerian resoluteness with subjectivity appear, for example, in the sublime distance it takes, on the level of its own Being, from the entanglements of the everyday (even if it remains in fact actively involved with the world), and with the gathering of itself into the "moment." Indeed, the fact that Heidegger wants to exclude anxiety from the "moment" of resoluteness as such is perhaps a symptom of this 15 This conversation remains of interest because we are living in an age-a post-Enlightenment, ambivalently secularized age-in which we are still caught between, on the one hand, a subjective truth or a subjectivity of truth made possible and necessary by the privatization of faith, i.e. by "tolerance," and on the other hand, a public discourse of rationality, scientific and/or philosophical, that would replace the objectivity of pre-Enlightenment discourses of revelation.
Anxiety is in Kierkegaard and Heidegger a "subjective" and "existenziell" state, respectively, that functions as the threshold of a non-subjective absolute, divine and/or ontological, in the one case defined in more religious and particularist terms, in the other case in somewhat more secular and universalist ones. At a moment when the objective revelations are making a public come-back, and religion is politicizing itself with a vengeance, maybe a return to their concerns with anxiety is not such a bad idea.
anxiety. To possess oneself is impossible, and yet to flee oneself is equally impossible. One is bound over to oneself, and in being bound to oneself one is bound inexorably to what comes of itself, the absolute future" (191).
9 Cf. Lévinas' remarks in response to Jean Wahl's lecture on "A Short History of Existentialism," where Lévinas emphasizes that Heidegger displaces the notion of a "potentiality which passes into act" (52) by discovering in death the possibility of the realization of "the impossibility of all realization" (52), "the possible as such" thought independently of the act and its finality.
10 Cf. Lévinas' displacement of this motif in his remarks, in "À propos de 'Kierkegaard Vivant'" (Noms propres, 91; Proper Names, 78), on the "incognito" status that should be accorded to truth as the (persecuted) truth of the Other, beyond all revelation, who puts the ego in question by virtue of its implied infinite responsibility.
11 Another dimension of Heidegger's critique of Kierkegaard's construal of the "moment" consists in Heidegger's (inconsistently maintained, but explicit) claim that anxiety is to be kept separate from the "moment," because the former "brings one into the mood for a possible resolution" (344; 328), but does not accomplish but only glimpse the possibility of repetition that, when realized, will constitute resolution itself (343; 327-8). Whereas Kierkegaard posits that "anxiety is the moment" (81), Heidegger places anxiety just on the threshold of the moment and its resolution, apparently because anxiety (as a mood) is too passive to constitute the more active stance of resoluteness per se. The tension and indeterminacy of the difference between possibility and actualization troubles here Heidegger's already problematic reservations with respect to the relative passivity and subjectivism of anxiety qua mood on the limit of decision.
12 See Karl Löwith, Martin Heidegger and European Nihilism, 214. 13 Cf. Lévinas, in "Kierkegaard: Existence et éthique," where (as elsewhere) he defines the dimension of "hauteur" ("height") in terms of the "double mouvement de la responsabilité" ("double movement of responsibility") whereby "Celui dont j'ai à répondre, c'est celui à qui j'ai à répondre" ("The one to whom I am answerable is the same one for whom I am answerable") (Nom propres, 86; Proper Names, 74).
14 See also the essays by Simon Critchley, Dominic Janicaud, Jean-Luc Marion, and Rudi Visker, in Critchley and Dews, Deconstructive Subjectivities, for
